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In my lecture I would like to give a general introduction to a comparative approach of Polish and 
Hungarian history. I am convinced it could be not only an interesting, but a relevant issue as well. This 
approach could be touching emotionally for average Hungarian and Polish people because both 
nations strongly felt last centuries that they had common historical fate in East Central Europe. There 
is evidence which prove that Polish-Hungarian friendship is not only a modern phenomenon, but it is 
originated from the historical past. Historical memory calls the attention that Polish-Hungarian 
friendship was rooted already in the early modern history, and it was not constructed by historians, but 
a special relationship between the two nations was a widespread and accepted concept for the wider 
public in Hungary. I can cite the well-known proverb which represents it: „Pole and Hungarian – two 
good friends, joint fight and drinking are their ends.” In this lecture I don’t want to give a complete list 
of differences and similarities, but to call the attention to some interesting aspects of two nations’ 
common historical fate.   
The relationship between Polish and Hungarian history is not an emotional question for historians. To 
characterize similarities and differences between the two nations’ historical process could be relevant 
approach for historiography. The analysis of Central European peoples’ common characeristics can be 
originated from the 20th century historiography. It was examined by Polish, Czech and Hungarian 
historians. Between the World War I and World War II Handelsman, Halecki and Bidlo dealt with this 
problem. Their concepts were published at an international historical congress in the 1930s. In 
Hungary an internationally wellknown medievist, Jenő Szűcs expressed his opinion about common 
features of Czech, Polish and Hungarian historical development in the 1980s.  
Jenő Szűcs created a characteristic concept of Central Europe. He supposed that foundations of Central 
European history at the first millenium were in close connection with Western European development. 
He explained that between the 11th and 15th centuries not only Christianization and its cultural 
consequences were implemented, but well-defined social features emerged in Central Europe based on 
Western characteristics. The keyword of Western social development after millenium was the spread 
of liberties and autonomies in Western Europe. These phenomena appeared in the middle of the 13th 
century in Central European countries. We find self-governments of towns, counties and parliaments 
at the beginning of the 14th centuries. Szűcs argued that these medieval characteristics of Central 
European historical features were the fundamental reason why we could classify Poland and Hungary 
as countries with the tradition of freedom which makes this region a part of Western development. 
This led to the concept in the 1980s that Central Europe couldn’t be seen as an inherent part of East 
Europe any more. It became impossible to find a historical argument to maintain the reason of Russian 
military occupation in the last decade of the Cold War.  
To identify European history with tradition of freedom is a well-konwn and widespread interpretation 
not only for European historiography but for European political philosophy as well. This concept had a 
special meaning during the Cold War because freedom or lack of freedom seemed to be the basic 
difference between West and East for Western political thinkers. The concept of freedom was 
overevaluated as a fundamental element of Western political tradition in these decades. It was in 
strong connection with the concepts of the antitotalitarian thinkers between World War I and World 
War II. The concept of freedom appeared as a justification of Western characteristics for Central 
European opposition intelligentsia in the 1980s, and played an important role in redefining Central 
European identification and self-interpretation for opposition circles. With the help of this concept 
they were able to distinguish themselves from East Europe and Russia.         
After this general introduction I would like to say some words about the origins of Polish and 
Hungarian history. There was a strong difference between Polish tribes who settled down gradually, 
and whose settlement area took shape as a consequence of a long and invisible process in the 9-10th 
centruries, and Hungarian tribes who arrived at the Carpathian Basin as a result of a spectacular, fast 
and unplanned immigration. 
There are common particulars during the birth of the states at the first millenium in Poland and in 
Hungary. This process took more than one generation. It was Mieszko that began and Boleslaw that 
continued the state-building and introduced Christianity in Poland. It was Géza that began and Stephen 
that implemented it in Hungary. The first generation had to destroy the old pagan and tribal system, 
and the second generation had a chance to build up a new order in both countries. The representatives 
of the second generation, Boleslaw and Stephen were crowned which represented their fundamental 
results.  
Both Boleslaw and Stephen enjoyed the favourable short-term consequences of two idealist politicians 
at the first milleneum. These two idealists were Emperor Otto III and Pope Sylvester. They supported 
the birth of independent Christian states in Central Europe. Spread of Christianization seemed to be 
more important for them than to demonstrate the influence of the Holy Roman Empire over newly 
emerging Central European states.  
It was also the result of this short favourable historical period that Polish and Hungarian churches were 
founded as archiepiscopacies independently from the German church. The consequence of these 
foundations can be seen clearly if we compare the situation of the Polish and Hungarian churches with 
the Czech church. There was only an episcopacy in Prague subordinated to the archbishop of Mainz. 
The bishop of Prague became archbishop only in the 14th century. Dependence from the German 
church was a chance for German political and cultural influence, which was refused in Poland and 
Hungary already at the beginnings with the early birth of archiepiscopacies.   
Let me say some words about the medieval age after the historical beginnings. There is a definite 
difference between Polish and Hungarian historical development from the 11th to the 14th centuries. 
The Árpád’s dynasty was able to maintain the unity of the country during these centuries. There were 
conflicts among members of the dynasty which didn’t lead to the disintegration of the country. Kings 
sometimes had to give enormous areas to their ambitious sons who ruled over a significant part of the 
kingdom almost independently from the king. There was a Hungarian tradition of the so-called junior 
king, which demonstrated the wide autonomy of the archduke towards the king in power. This 
phenomenon didn’t result in a weakening state. There was only a short period in medieval Hungary 
after the demise of the Árpád’s dynasty when the strongest landlords (barons) almost disintegrated the 
state.  
In Poland the size of disintegration can be depicted in a totally different way. There were longer 
periods in the 12th and 13th centuries when the Polish kingdom existed only virtually. Princes had 
wide autonomy. In the middle of the 13th century the fragmentation of the country was on its climax. 
The role of the kings was actually eliminated, and the Catholic Church had crucial significance in 
maintaining the spiritual unity of the nation. It was a turning point in the Polish history when Lokietek 
Wladislaw was crowned with the help of the pope, which represented the strenghtening unity of the 
country at the beginning of the 14th century. This political process was similar to the Hungarian 
political development where Angevin (Anjou) dynasty also strenghtened the central power. In the 14th 
and 15th centuries both countries developed towards national unity. Moreover, we can see similar 
social development in both countries. There were two important aspects of these similarities, firstly 
emerging urban autonomies, secondly formation of nobility’s rights. The beginnings of urban 
autonomies originated from the 13th century in both countries. German urban patterns had an absolute 
effect in Poland. We find German and Italian urban patterns in Hungary.  
How could we characterize the nobility’s widening rights in Poland and in Hungary? The 
strenghtening nobility narrowed the king’s power in both countries. By the end of the medieval age 
there was a widespread concept that it was not only the king that represented the country but he shared 
his supremacy with nobility as well. This was demonstrated in Werbőczy’s laws in Hungary at the 
beginning of the 16th century. Werbőczy was a legal expert who summarized medieval Hungarian 
law. He suggested that the country should be represented by the Sacred Crown which consisted of the 
king and the nobility. There were similar political thoughts in Poland too.  
In general the nobles’ rights widened in Poland and Hungary during the 14-15th centuries. The 
bourgoise was weak in both countries, which increased the nobility’s importance. The rise of the 
bourgoise in Western European countries resulted in decreasing significance of the nobility in early 
modern times. The relationship between the king and the nobility became the key issue of the late 
medieval Hungarian and Polish states. It is more than an interesting coincidence that Angevin Louis, 
the king of Hungary in the 14th century, who later became king of Poland too, was the ruler who 
widened the rights of the Polish nobility. He did the same in Hungary too. It was an important step for 
Polish and Hungarian nobilities in their development towards getting autonomy and rights. It can be 
seen as a symbolic moment that the charter of privilegies for Polish nobility’s rights was issued by 
Angevin Louis in town Kassa in Hungary.   
The 15th century can be interpreted not only as a period for tendencies of similar social development, 
but the two countries were joined by common struggle against the Turkish Empire. After Habsburg 
Albert’s death, who was the king of Hungary for a short time in the middle of the 15th century, the 
majority of Hungarian nobility elected the Polish king Wladislaw as the king of Hungary with the 
support of the strongest baron of Hungary, Hunyadi János (John Hunyadi). The arguments for 
Wladislaw were simple, but essential. Everybody hoped that the kingdom of Poland could give 
effective help to Hungary against the Turkish Empire. By that time Hunyadi had already conquered 
Turkish troops several times at the southern border of the country. He was considedered as a hero by 
the Hungarian public. The young Polish-Hungarian king and Hunyadi cooperated against Turkish 
power which opened one of the most beautiful chapters of the two nations’ history in the 15th century. 
In the 16-17th century Poland and Hungary became the bulwark of Christianity against the Turkish 
Empire. This long-term historical role began with the military cooperation between Wladislaw and 
Hunyadi in the middle of the 15th century.              
In the 16th century we find increasing divergence between Poland and Hungary. This century was a 
„golden age” for Poland if we take into consideration the military power of the Polish state in 
comparison with Russia, or the increasing export of agricultural products towards Western countries. 
It was an exceptionally favourable period for export due to the so-called price revolution and 
economic boom in agriculture. Further factor of the „golden age” was the cultural flourishing of the 
Polish renaissance.  
In this period Hungary was divided into three parts, and one third of the country was occupied by the 
Turkish Empire. The unity and sovereignty of the country became a fundamental problem for 
Hungary. Habsburg and Turkish troops devastated the country continously. In the 16th century the 
University of Cracow attracted many Hungarian students, who returned to Hungary with the spirit of 
Polish humanism. There was a crucial gap in Hungarian education: the lack of a university until the 
17th century resulted in an increasing cultural importance of the Cracow university for Hungarian 
education in early modern times.    
In the age of reformation Catholic-Protestant conflict wasn’t so rude in Poland as in Hungary. In 
general Poland remained a Catholic country with tolerancy towards weak Protestantism, but in 
Hungary there were bloody wars between Catholic and Protestant churches which were in close 
connection with the problems of Habsburg (Catholic) centralization and preservation of (Protestant) 
nobility’s rights. Dominating catholicism and ortodoxy in the eastern regions of Poland led to special 
problems, which contributed to the decline of the country’s unity in the 17th century.   
Eliberation of Hungary from Turkish Empire was a symbolic moment in the field of interconnections 
between Poland and Hungary at the end of the 17th century. This was the starting point of Hungary’s 
reunification, and the last moment when Polish great power was able to influence Central European 
political events. By September 12 1683, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa’s enormous army had been 
besieging Wien for two months. Finally, the imperial forces united with the troops of John III. 
Sobieski, king of Poland, who came to relieve, and conquered the Turkish besiegers. The Grand Vizier 
wanted to continue the war, and Christian armies won further battles attacking the enemies along the 
Danube. These military events were under commandment of Sobieski, who was a talented main 
general of allied troops and completely devoted himself to eliberating Hungary. He left an impression 
on Hungarian history. He was the last king who maintained the illusion and reality of Polish great 
power. It was a special chance for Hungary that his activity had favourable impact on Hungarian 
history.                                          
The permanent struggle between Habsburg centralization and Hungarian nobility led to a balance in 
the long run in the 16-18th centuries. This was the reason why dualism was maintained between the 
king’s and nobility’s power even until modern times. In Poland the 17th century was a turning point, 
when dualism – sharing power between king and nobility – developed towards a noble republic model, 
which was based on the articuli Henriciani and the extremely widening right of using veto. This 
process resulted in radical restriction of the king’s power and led to the external weakness of the 
kingdom in comparison with the strenghtening absolutisms, which surrounded Poland. The increasing 
power of these absolutist states was in sharp contrast with Poland’s collapse. This tendency became 
the fundamental reason of the country’s divison into three parts. The frustration originating from the 
loss of the independence hindered Polish elites to find long-term compromises with the Russian 
emperor who had occupied a major part of the country. Perhaps a compromise would have been able 
to lead to a solid balance between national interests and Russian occupation. Due to the wide 
competencies of the self-government Hungary was able to find the route between national autonomy 
and Habsburg Empire easier in the 19th century.     
Tragedy of Polish state can’t be derived from the presumption that Polish nobility might have been 
more conservative than Hungarian nobles and this might have been the most important reason why 
they weren’t able to strenghten and to renew the country. No, it was rather a political bargain among 
the surrounding great powers which led to the disappearence of Poland. In the last moment of the 
independence enlightened circles of Polish nobility wanted to modernize the country. Moreover, 
enlightenment emerged in both countries, which had its influence on nobilities. At the end of the 18th 
century enlightened Polish and Hungarian nobilities put emphasis on modernization programmes. This 
tendency was continued in the reform age in Hungary in the first half of the 19th century which 
enabled the strong interconnection between patriotism and progress. Hungarian political thinkers 
expressed that their keywords were patriotism and progress, and we find a similar way of thinking in 
Poland. European cultural movements – for example romanticism – had strong impact on both 
countries in the 19th centrury. With the help of Western European political and cultural patterns Polish 
and Hungarian political thinkers realised that the modernization of the country is more important than 
particular interests of traditional elites. They were able to work out national-level programmes. 
Although the implementation of these concepts were hindered by Russian and Austrian absolutisms, 
the strong correlation of patriotism and progress guaranteed that issues of economic-social 
modernization could not be expropriated by Russian and Austrian absolutist rulers. 
In the 19th century the possibility of the nation’s death meant a central problem for Hungarian 
patriots, which was articulated in strong connection with the feeling of fear towards nationalities – it is 
important to call the attention to the fact that (as a consequence of resettlement of the country after 
Turkish occupation) Hungary became a multiethnic country in the 18th century and only half of the 
population spoke Hungarian language. In contrast, it was not the vanishing of the nation but the lack 
of the state that emerged as a fundamental difficulty for the Polish.  
After the First World War the ethnic homogenity of the post-Trianon Hungary – which had lost two 
third part of the former Hungarian kingdom – and the multiethnic character of Polish great power 
created by peace system of Versailles were in sharp contrast with each other. In spite of this, basic 
difference neither Poland’s nor Hungary’s political position was guaranteeed in Central Europe due to 
the imminent German and Soviet great powers. In the 20th century similar historical experiences 
created a similar pattern of geopolitic self-interpretation in both countries. It was a widespread 
approach among political and cultural elites to see the geopolitic situation of the country as something 
that was determined by Russian and German great powers. This concept was integrated into a wider 
historical framework by some political thinkers and historians (for example by Oscar Halecki).  
After the Second World War Poland and Hungary became part of the Soviet bloc, but historical 
development of these countries in the last half century could be distinguished in many details. During 
the epoch of the Soviet Empire Polish civil society was able to preserve more autonomy than 
Hungarian society. The Polish Catholic Church was able to preserve its integrity to a greater extent 
towards the one-party state. The small-holders in the countryside also preserved their land in Poland 
while in Hungary they were forced to enter common propriety forms. On the other hand, the economic 
development seemed to be more successful in the Hungarian countryside. In Poland the power didn’t 
confiscate small-holders’ land, but withdrew financial sources from villages, which was in sharp 
contrast with modernizing Hungarian agriculture, which was becoming target of state development 
sources.        
In the last decades we find a basic difference between Polish and Hungarian democratization process. 
It was a result of an ambigous political bargain between communist and oppositon elites in Hungary 
with low intensity of social participation. In Poland the situation was different. Strong and widespread 
social movement emerged in the 1980s as a result of Solidarnoszty’ s activity. Although the real 
picture is more complex (for example in the 1980s the Polish oppostion elites also made compromises 
with the communist power, Solidarnoszty’s activity didn’t lead immediately to freedom, and not only 
social movements, but external relations also contributed to the success of the Polish opposition), the 
Polish society was able to consider the first free election as a result reached by themselves. 
These differences had important consequences in the last twenty years. Acceptance or refusal of 
political bargain between communist and oppositon elites has become a basic dividing line of the 
political scene in Hungary for the last two decades. We can interpret fundamental divisions of the 
Hungarian political scene mainly with the help of this difference even these days. The social 
movements in the 1980s guaranteed the feeling of the Polish society that they could provoke their 
freedom under their steam, whereas the frustration of the Hungarian democracy even after 20 years 
since the first free election is owing to the fact that Hungarian people won the freedom without any 
struggle and the wide participation of the society. In the postcommunist period these preconditions 
permitted the strenghtening of the Polish national identity to a greater extent than of the Hungarian.  
 
Selected bibliography for further information:   
Kontler László (1999): A Millenium in Central Europe. A History of Hungary. Atlantisz Publishing 
House. Budapest.  
Davies, Norman (2005): God’s Playground. A History of Poland. I-II. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford. 
 
 
 
